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SUING PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS FOR
TORTURE: HOW TO USE THE ALIEN TORT
STATUTE WITHOUT GRANTING SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY-RELATED DEFENSES
Efrain Staino*
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States is currently engaged in two wars
overseas and operates military prisons in Iraq, Afghanistan,
and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.' The requirements of these
commitments have forced the U.S. government to rely on
private contractors, to an unprecedented extent, to meet its
increased global security demands.2 As a result, private
military contractors have been engaged in Iraq and
Afghanistan as security forces, logistics personnel,
interrogators, and translators, among other things.3 Their
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Santa Clara University School of Law; M.S. in Electrical Engineering, Lund
University, Sweden. I would like to thank my wife, Summer, for her love,
support, and patience through these years of law school; my daughter, Svea
Manon, for all the joy she brings to my life; and our families for always being
there to lend a hand and provide encouragement. Special thanks also to
professors David Sloss and Beth Van Schaack for their advice and valuable
comments on earlier drafts, and to the Santa Clara Law Review editors for their
contributions to the final version.
1. Eric Schmitt & Tim Golden, U.S. Set to Build Big New Prison in
Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2008, at Al (comparing the new prison being
built by the United States in Afghanistan with the ones the United States runs
at Guantanamo Bay and in Iraq).
2. John M. Broder & David Rohde, State Department Use of Contractors
Leaps in 4 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2007, at Al (reporting the quadrupling,
from one to four billion, of the State Department's expenditures on private
contractors due to the increased demand). Throughout this comment, I will use
the terms private military contractor, government contractor, and private
contractor interchangeably.
3. See Ibrahim v. Titan Corp. (Ibrahim 1), 391 F. Supp. 2d 10, 12-13
(D.D.C. 2005) (discussing interrogators and interpreters); Joshua Kurlantzick,
Outsourcing the Dirty Work: The Military and its Reliance on Hired Guns,
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involvement has been controversial. Allegations of atrocities
committed by private military contractors have exposed
weaknesses in our legal system's ability to hold the
perpetrators accountable and deliver justice to the victims.4
The main questions for the courts to answer are whether, and
to what extent, private contractors can be held liable for acts
that amount to torture as defined by international law and
incorporated into U.S. law.' These questions give rise to a
number of issues concerning the amount of official
government involvement required for an act to be defined as
torture and when, if ever, a private contractor is exempt from
liability under state sovereign immunity or other related
defenses.6
This comment will discuss the use of the Alien Tort
Statute (ATS), also known as the Alien Tort Claims Act
(ATCA), as a tool to hold private contractors working for the
U.S. government accountable for acts of torture. It shows
that federal courts can hold a private contracting corporation
or its employees liable under the ATS for acts that amount to
torture under international law without automatically
granting the defendant's affirmative defense of sovereign
immunity or the government contractor defense. To find the
private contractor liable for torture, the plaintiff must argue
AM. PROSPECT, Apr. 30, 2003, http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=
outsourcing-the-dirty-work (discussing the U.S. military's increased
dependence on private military contractors).
4. See Ibrahim v. Titan Corp. (Ibrahim I1), 556 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2007),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Saleh v. Titan Corp. (Saleh II), 580 F.3d 1
(D.C. Cir. 2009); Saleh v. Titan Corp. (Saleh 1), 436 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C.
2006); Ibrahim 1, 391 F. Supp. 2d 10.
5. See Torture Convention Implementation Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 2340
(2006) (codifying torture as a criminal offense); Torture Victim Protection Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, § 3(b), 106 Stat. 73, 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §
1350 note (2006)) (codifying torture as a tort creating civil liability); Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment art. 1, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Torture
Convention] (providing the international definition of torture).
6. This comment will not address the extent to which a private contractor
corporation can be held liable for acts committed by its employees under the
theory of respondeat superior. For a thorough analysis of this issue, see William
R. Casto, Regulating the New Privateers of the Twenty-First Century, 37
RUTGERS L.J. 671, 694-99 (2006). Thus, the comment will not tackle the
question of whether a potential plaintiff can sue the corporation as a whole or is
limited to only suing the individual employee that committed the torture. The
answer is obviously an important one for potential plaintiffs because the
corporation will more likely be able to pay any damages awarded to them.
[Vol:501278
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that there was government involvement in the commission of
the act, but this argument also strengthens the defendant's
immunity related defenses. Without the government's
involvement, the plaintiffs torture claim will fail, and if
defendant prevails on the affirmative defense, the contractor
will receive impunity for the atrocities. Either outcome would
leave the plaintiff without a legal remedy. This comment
proposes that the solution to this problem is recognizing that
the level of government or official involvement required for an
act to meet the definition of torture is significantly lower than
the level required for the private contractor to assert the
affirmative defenses that are normally reserved for the
government.
Part II of this comment discusses the history and current
state of the ATS and focuses on torture as a violation of
international law and a cause of action under the ATS.7 It
then summarizes possible defenses and briefly presents some
recent cases on point. Part III articulates the difficulties
facing plaintiffs attempting to hold private parties
accountable for torture.' Part IV analyzes the difference
between the state action requirement under the definition of
torture and the requirements to assert the immunity related
defenses.9 This comment proffers that there is a significant
gap between the two state action requirements and that a
private contractor could and should be found liable for torture
under the ATS when operating within that gap.
Finally, Part V proposes a solution that will allow victims
of torture at the hands of private contractors to seek justice in
federal courts. 10 This proposal would create civil liability for
private contractors, which should act as a significant
deterrent. This solution hinges on recognition that the
requisite government involvement for torture is lower than
that of sovereign immunity related defenses, and that a
finding of the former does not automatically result in a
finding of the latter. Applying this approach, courts should
analyze the facts of each individual case to determine
whether the private contractor's acts fall within the gap
where they can be held liable for torture, but immunity is
7. See discussion infra Part II.
8. See discussion infra Part III.
9. See discussion infra Part IV.
10. See discussion infra Part V.
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unavailable as a defense.
II. BACKGROUND: DEVELOPMENT OF THE ALIEN TORT
STATUTE AND RECENT CASES APPLYING THE STATUTE
A. Filartiga and the Resurgence of the Alien Tort Statute
The ATS, enacted as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789,11
creates federal subject matter jurisdiction for "any civil action
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States." 2 For nearly two
hundred years, plaintiffs rarely invoked the statute in federal
courts.'3 Then, in 1980, the Second Circuit sustained federal
jurisdiction under the ATS in its landmark decision Filartiga
v. Pena-Irala, giving new life to the old statute. 4
The events leading up to Filartiga began in Paraguay
in 1976."5 Police officers woke one of the plaintiffs, Dolly
Fildrtiga, early one morning and instructed her to collect the
body of her brother, who had been tortured to death by the
police. 6 Despite direct warnings by the police not to take any
action, the Fildrtiga family attempted, to no avail, to pursue
justice in Paraguayan courts. 17 When the family learned that
Pefia-Irala, a high-ranking police officer directly involved
with the murder, was in New York City, they followed him. 18
Working with attorneys at the Center for Constitutional
Rights, the family sued Pefia-Irala under the ATS for torture,
a violation of the law of nations. 19  The district court
dismissed the case, but, on appeal, the Second Circuit held
that the right to be free from torture, including torture
committed by the victim's own government, was a
11. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)).
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
13. See Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction over International Law
Claims: Inquiries into the Alien Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 4
n.15, 5 n.16 (1985) (listing twenty-one cases where plaintiffs asserted
jurisdiction under the statute and only two cases where the courts sustained
jurisdiction under the statute).
14. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
15. Beth Stephens, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala" From Family Tragedy to Human
Rights Accountability, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 623, 624 (2006).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 625.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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fundamental right under international law. 20 The court held
that torture was a violation of the law of nations for which
the ATS provided federal jurisdiction, thus allowing an alien
to sue his or her torturer in federal court if personal
jurisdiction is established. 21
Following Filartiga, federal courts looked to international
law to determine whether the defendant's alleged act
constituted a violation of the law of nations so the courts
could grant federal jurisdiction under the ATS.22 Courts went
beyond torture to address other international law violations
including war crimes, extrajudicial killings, genocide, forced
disappearances, and summary execution. 23  Federal courts
also addressed the issue of who can be sued under the ATS
when hearing cases against corporations, former heads of
state, private contractors, the United States, and local
officials. 24 For over two decades, ATS litigation took place in
the district and appellate courts, which upheld the core of
Filartiga without guidance from the United States Supreme
Court.25
20. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884-85 (2d Cir. 1980) ("[W~e
conclude that official torture is now prohibited by the law of nations.... [lit [is]
clear that international law confers fundamental rights upon all people vis-a-vis
their own governments.").
21. Id. at 878 ("[D]eliberate torture perpetrated under color of official
authority violates universally accepted norms of the international law of human
rights, regardless of the nationality of the parties. Thus, whenever an alleged
torturer is found and served with process by an alien within our borders, § 1350
provides federal jurisdiction.").
22. See Stephens, supra note 15, at 627-28.
23. See Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148 (11th Cir. 2005)
(discussing extrajudicial killing, torture, crimes against humanity, and cruel,
inhuman, or degrading punishment); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226
F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000) (discussing summary execution, torture, and arbitrary
detention); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996) (discussing
summary execution, torture, and forced disappearance); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70
F.3d 232, 244 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that subject matter jurisdiction was proper
under the ATS against a private party accused of having committed genocide,
war crimes, summary execution, and torture).
24. See Jama v. U.S.I.N.S. (Jama II), 343 F. Supp. 2d 338 (D.N.J. 2004)
(involving a private contractor running a detention facility for the United
States); Wiwa, 226 F.3d 88 (involving a corporation); Martinez v. City of Los
Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373 (9th Cir. 1998) (concerning local government officials);
Jama v. U.S.I.N.S (Jama 1), 22 F. Supp. 2d 353 (D.N.J. 1998) (discussing U.S.
officials and a private corporation); Hilao, 103 F.3d 767 (involving a former
head of state).
25. Stephens, supra note 15, at 628 ("The lower courts were unanimous in
upholding the core of the Filartiga decision: aliens could sue in federal court for
1282 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:50
B. The Sosa Court Defines the Scope of the Alien Tort Statute
and Leaves the Door Ajar for Future Litigation
The Supreme Court's first decision defining the scope of
the ATS came in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.2 6 Until then, most
courts had followed Filartiga's approach to ATS litigation and
looked to international law to find a limited number of new
causes of action under the ATS.27 Critics, however, began
questioning Filartiga when suits against multinational
corporations became more frequent in the late 1990s. 21 The
core of the critics' argument was that, because the ATS only
provided courts with subject matter jurisdiction, Congress
had to create an express statutory cause of action for a
violation of international law.29 Critics argued that without
an express statute, the ATS had no real application and
would not alone grant plaintiffs access to the federal courts.3 0
Proponents of Filartiga disagreed and argued that the ATS
had expressly created a new cause of action for violations of
international law that allows plaintiffs to sue directly for
violations of the ATS.31 In 2004, the Supreme Court resolved
this dispute in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain by rejecting both
extremes.2 The Court determined that the ATS was purely a
a small set of egregious violations of international law.").
26. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
27. BETH STEPHENS, JUDITH CHOMSKY, JENNIFER GREEN, PAUL HOFFMAN
& MICHAEL RATNER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S.
COURTS 16 (2d ed. 2008) (noting that while courts followed Filartiga's lead, they
"took seriously its requirements of careful scrutiny of ATS claims" and
dismissed most of them).
28. Id. at 17 (noting that there was little attention when suits for human
rights violations were filed against foreign individuals, who often were
judgment proof, but when multinational corporations started to become the
targets, critical voices became more common).
29. Id. ("[By the late 1990s,] scholars began to challenge the theory
underlying Fildrtiga's application of the ATS, arguing that the statute granted
jurisdiction but did not create a cause of action and that the federal courts did
not have the constitutional authority to derive a cause of action from either
international law or domestic common law.").
30. See, e.g., Sosa, 542 U.S. at 714 (rejecting defendant's argument that "the
ATS was stillborn because there could be no claim for relief without a further
statute expressly authorizing adoption of causes of action").
31. See e.g., id. at 713 (rejecting the plaintiffs argument that "the ATS was
intended not simply as a jurisdictional grant, but as authority for the creation of
a new cause of action for torts in violation of international law").
32. See id. at 714 (agreeing with the argument that "federal courts could
entertain claims once the jurisdictional grant was on the books, because torts
in violation of the law of nations would have been recognized within the
LIABLE FOR ACTS OF TORTURE
jurisdictional statute, but that Congress intended it to have
practical effect at its inception based on causes of action
provided by common law at the time.33 The Court further
explained that the ATS allows federal courts to use their
common law powers to create a limited set of new causes of
action for violations of the law of nations.34
In Sosa, a Mexican physician, Humberto Alvarez-
Machain (Alvarez), was abducted from Mexico and brought to
the United States to stand trial on allegations that he had
been involved in the torture and murder of a Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent. The DEA
employed Mexican nationals, including Jose Francisco Sosa,
to carry out Alvarez's abduction.36  Alvarez was held
overnight in a motel in Mexico and was then flown to the
United States, where federal officers arrested him7.3  Alvarez
fought his criminal conviction to the Supreme Court, and on
remand, a district court eventually acquitted Alvarez of all
charges.38
Once back in Mexico, Alvarez brought a civil suit against
Sosa, the United States, and others.39  Alvarez sued Sosa
under the ATS for a violation of the law of nations, claiming
he had been arbitrarily arrested and detained in Mexico.4"
He sued the U.S. government under the Federal Tort Claims
common law of the time"); see also STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 27, at 19-20
(summarizing the Sosa Court's holding as stating that "Itihe ATS is a
jurisdictional statute enacted on the assumption that the courts would use their
common law powers to recognize a small number of common law claims for
violations of international norms" (citing Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712-24)).
33. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724 ("[A]lthough the ATS is a jurisdictional statute
creating no new causes of action, the reasonable inference from the historical
materials is that the statute was intended to have practical effect the moment it
became law. The jurisdictional grant is best read as having been enacted on the
understanding that the common law would provide a cause of action for the
modest number of international law violations with a potential for personal
liability at the time.").
34. Id. at 725 ("[Nothing] has categorically precluded federal courts from
recognizing a claim under the law of nations as an element of common law ....
Still, there are good reasons for a restrained conception of the discretion a
federal court should exercise in considering a new cause of action of this kind.")
35. Id. at 697-98.
36. Id. at 698.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 698 (2004).
40. Id.
2010] 1283
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Act (FTCA),41 which provides a waiver of sovereign immunity
and allows suit against the U.S. government for injury
"caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
employee of the Government while acting within the scope of
his office or employment."42 The case reached the Supreme
Court on appeal from the Ninth Circuit, and the Court held
the FTCA claim barred by the statute's foreign country
exception, which exempts the waiver of sovereign immunity
for claims arising outside the United States.43 Rejecting the
Ninth Circuit's argument that because the planning had
taken place in the United States it did not fall within the
foreign country exception, the Supreme Court held that the
exception applies to "any injury suffered in a foreign country,
regardless of where the tortious act or omission occurred.""
In the highly anticipated decision regarding the scope of
the ATS, the Supreme Court ruled against Alvarez, but did
not shut the door on ATS litigation, which some human rights
activists had feared might happen. 45  Holding that the
common law would provide the cause of action, the Sosa
Court articulated a narrow test for when courts should
recognize new causes of action under the ATS. 46  The test
requires "any claim based on the present-day law of nations
to rest on a norm of international character accepted by the
civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to
the features of the 18th-century paradigms."47 According to
Sosa, Congress intended the Judiciary Act of 1789 to apply to
three offenses that were violations of the law of nations at
that time: "[(1)] violation of safe conducts, [(2)] infringement
41. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-80 (2006); see
discussion infra Part II.E.1.
42. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).
43. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 701-02 (citing the foreign country exception in 28
U.S.C. § 2680(k), which bars FTCA claims).
44. Id. at 702, 712 (rejecting the Ninth Circuit's argument that the
headquarters doctrine should apply to make the acts domestic and not foreign
and holding that "the FTCA's foreign country exception bars all claims based on
any injury suffered in a foreign country, regardless of where the tortious act or
omission occurred").
45. See STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 27, at 20 (noting that human rights
activists warily awaited the Sosa decision and hailed the ruling as a victory
because they believed it endorsed the approach used by the lower courts since
Filartiga, while critics of Filartiga argued that the Court had imposed
additional limits on ATS litigation).
46. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724.
47. Id. at 725.
1284 [Vol:50
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of the rights of ambassadors, and [(3)] piracy."' Thus,
federal courts can use common law powers to create a narrow
set of new causes of action in violation of the law of nations,
provided the courts use caution in exercising this discretion
by ensuring that the violations are comparable to the limited
international law violations recognized in 1789."9 Applying
this standard, the Court analyzed Alvarez's arbitrary arrest
and detention claim and held that "a single illegal detention
of less than a day, followed by the transfer of custody to
lawful authorities and a prompt arraignment, violates no
norm of customary international law so well defined as to
support the creation of a federal remedy."S°
Following the Court's ruling in Sosa, district courts now
have binding guidelines for how to determine whether the
claim warrants the creation of a cause of action under the
ATS. 51 Lower courts cannot simply rely on old case law to
conclude that a particular claim is not actionable under the
ATS.52 Instead, a court should first analyze whether the
alleged violation meets the Sosa standard of "a widely
accepted, clearly defined international law norm,"53 and then
determine whether the particular defendant violated that
norm. If the first step is met, the court should recognize a
48. Id. at 724.
49. Id. at 724-25.
50. Id. at 738.
51. See id. at 725 (providing the test for when a court should recognize a
new cause of action); Jama 11, 343 F. Supp. 2d 338, 358 (D.N.J. 2004) ("Sosa
requires that this court revise its legal rulings and employ a different method of
analysis in determining if plaintiffs have produced evidence to support an
ATCA claim against any of the remaining defendants."); see also William R.
Casto, The New Federal Common Law of Tort Remedies for Violations of
International Law, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 635, 635-36 (2006) ("[Alll analyses of ATS
litigation must flow from Sosa's guidelines."); Eugene Kontorovich,
Implementing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain" What Piracy Reveals About the Limits
of the Alien Tort Statute, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 111, 113 (2004) ("The test is
historical, requiring a close examination of those 'characteristics' of the
eighteenth century offenses that gave them their special status in the common
law and the law of nations. Applying this test to a variety of purported new
international norms will become a significant subject of litigation in the lower
courts in the wake of Sosa, litigation that could result in conflicting decisions
due to the Court's scant description of the test it envisions.").
52. Although the Sosa standard announces the scope of the ATS, it does not
mark a significant departure from most of the ATS litigation conducted prior to
Sosa, which would most likely have complied with the Sosa standard.
STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 27, at 25.
53. Id. at 54 (articulating the Sosa standard).
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new cause of action under the ATS and allow plaintiff to sue
defendant for violating the international law norm.
C. Torture Is a Recognized Cause of Action Under the Alien
Tort Statute
The Sosa decision settled what had largely been assumed
since Filartiga-that torture is a recognized cause of action
under the ATS. The Sosa Court held that federal courts may
create new causes of action under the ATS and cited Filartiga
as an example of where judicial recognition of a violation of
the law of nations, namely torture, clearly warranted the
creation of a cause of action under the ATS. 54 Furthermore,
much of the ATS litigation in lower courts since Filartiga and
Sosa has addressed torture and determined that it is a valid
cause of action for a violation of the law of nations under the
ATS.55
In 1984, the United Nations adopted the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (Torture Convention).56  The
Torture Convention adds to the customary international law
prohibition on torture and requires that its parties use
domestic legal systems to punish those who commit acts of
torture.5" The United States ratified the Torture Convention
54. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 (quoting Filartiga's comparison of the torturer of
today to the pirate of 1789, and citing Filartiga's application of torture as a
cause of action as an example where the federal courts correctly recognized a
"private claimG under federal common law for violations of [an] international
law norm").
55. See, e.g., Arce v. Garcia, 434 F.3d 1254, 1256, 1264 (11th Cir. 2006)
(upholding a lower court's jury verdict finding two Salvadorian military leaders
liable for torture under ATS); Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148 (11th
Cir. 2005) (finding the Chilean ex-military officer liable for torture under ATS);
Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 945 (9th Cir. 2002) ("We have recognized
that torture, murder, and slavery are jus cogens violations and, thus, violations
of the law of nations."), vacated, 395 F.3d 978, 979 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc);
Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 778 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that the
defendant's actions, which included torture, were "violations... of ajus cogens
norm of international law"); Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp.
2d 1164, 1179 (C.D. Cal. 2005) ("[The Court holds that the existence of the
TVPA is strong evidence that the prohibition against torture is a binding
customary international law norm."); see also STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 27,
at 140 ("[Elvery court to consider the issue has agreed that torture fits within
[the ATS's] reach.").
56. Torture Convention, supra note 5.
57. DJ HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 763 (6th ed.
2004).
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in 1994,"s  and enacted the Torture Convention
Implementation Act (Torture Act)59 in its criminal code that
same year, making it a criminal offense to commit torture
outside the United States.6" In 1992, Congress enacted the
Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA),6' providing both aliens
and U.S. citizens a modern cause of action for claims against
"[an individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or
color of law, of any foreign nation ... subjects an individual to
torture."62 The TVPA is commonly viewed as Congress'
approval of Filartiga and a codification of its holding that
torture, as a violation of the law of nations, provides a cause
of action under the ATS.63 Furthermore, the legislative
history makes clear that the TVPA was not intended to
replace the ATS, and courts have held that the TVPA does
not limit the scope and applicability of the ATS.'
The Sosa decision referred to the Restatement (Third) of
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
(Restatement), which includes torture as a violation of
international law. 65 The Court looked to the Restatement for
58. The United States ratified the Torture Convention on October 21, 1994.
See United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of Multilateral Treaties Deposited
with the Secretary General, Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSGNolume%20IChapter%20IV/IV-
9.en.pdf (last visited April 10, 2010).
59. Torture Convention Implementation Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-236, §
506(a), 108 Stat. 382, 463 (1994) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (2006)).
60. 18 U.S.C. § 2340A.
61. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006).
62. Id. § 1350 note 2(a).
63. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 731 (2004) (stating that
federal courts and Congress have been in agreement with the decision of
Filartiga, as evidenced by the enactment of the TVPA); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 105 (2d Cir. 2000) ("The TVPA thus recognizes
explicitly what was perhaps implicit in the Act of 1789-that the law of nations
is incorporated into the law of the United States and that a violation of the
international law of human rights is (at least with regard to torture) ipso facto a
violation of U.S. domestic law."); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 241 (2d Cir.
1995) ("Congress enacted the Torture Victim Act to codify the cause of action
recognized by this Circuit in Filartiga, and to further extend that cause of
action to plaintiffs who are U.S. citizens."); see also STEPHENS ET AL., supra note
27, at 80-81.
64. STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 27, at 75, 81-82 (stating that the lower
courts have been unanimous in concluding that the TVPA does not alter the
scope of the ATS and pointing to the Sosa Court's understanding of this view).
65. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. §
702(d) (1987).
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a definition of "arbitrary detention" under international law
to determine whether Alvarez had stated a valid cause of
action under the ATS.6" Finding that Alvarez's short
detention did not satisfy the Restatement's definition of
"prolonged arbitrary detention,""7 the Court rejected his claim
as insufficient to constitute a violation of the law of nations
under the ATS.m The Court's reliance on the Restatement to
determine if the violation warranted the creation of a cause of
action under the ATS and the Restatement's explicit
reference to torture as a violation of international law should
be sufficient to place torture as a cause of action within the
Sosa standard.
D. The Definition of Torture Requires the Act to Be
Committed with the Consent or Acquiescence of a Public
Official-Nothing More
The Torture Convention provides the generally accepted
definition of torture under international law:69
torture means any act by which severe pain or suffering,
whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a
person ... when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at
the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a
public official or other person acting in an official
capacity.70
Torture is, therefore, not limited to acts committed by public
officials, but rather a private party could commit torture if
there is "consent or acquiescence of a public official."71 The
66. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 737.
67. RESTATEMENT (TIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. §
702(e) (1987).
68. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 738 ("[A] single illegal detention of less than a day,
followed by the transfer of custody to lawful authorities and a prompt
arraignment, violates no norm of customary international law so well defined as
to support the creation of a federal remedy.").
69. See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F.
Supp. 2d 289, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("The most commonly accepted definition [of
torture] is that found in the Torture Convention."); STEPHENS ET AL., supra note
27, at 141; Johan D. van der Vyver, Torture as a Crime Under International
Law, 67 ALB. L. REV. 427, 432 (2003) ("The definitions of torture contained in
international instruments are not identical. Even so, there is a tendency to
regard the definition of torture contained in the Torture Convention as
reflecting a consensus 'representative of customary international law.'" (quoting
Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, 459 (Nov. 16, 1998))).
70. Torture Convention, supra note 5, art. 1.
71. Antonio Marchesi, Implementing the UN Convention Definition of
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exact meaning of "consent or acquiescence" may be debated,
but it should be clear from its language that private parties
can commit torture under the Torture Convention's
definition.
When signing the Torture Convention, the United States
expressed an understanding that "the term 'acquiescence'
requires that the public official, prior to the activity
constituting torture, have awareness of such activity and
thereafter breach his legal responsibility to intervene to
prevent such activity."7 2 This definition does not weaken the
argument that a private individual is capable of committing
torture under the Torture Convention's definition. If
anything, it strengthens it because, if awareness by the public
official of the act amounting to torture is sufficient, the public
official does not need to be directly involved in the private
party's commission of the act for it to be torture under
international law.73
Several of the circuit courts of appeals have interpreted
the meaning of the term "acquiescence" under the Torture
Convention in cases brought by asylum seekers who claimed
that they would be tortured if sent back to their country of
origin.74 These courts have held that Congress intended the
term "acquiescence" in the Torture Convention to mean
awareness and "willful blindness," and does not require proof
that the public official had actual knowledge of the torture.75
Torture in National Criminal Law (with Reference to the Special Case of Italy), 6
J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 195, 211 (2008) (noting that Article 1 of the Torture
Convention does not limit the definition of the actor to public officials and
"[tihus, on condition that it is inflicted 'at the instigation of or with the consent
or acquiescence of a public official,' torture can be inflicted by private
individuals as well").
72. 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(7) (2010).
73. See Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186, 1195 (9th Cir. 2003) ("The Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations expressly stated that the purpose of requiring
awareness, and not knowledge, 'is to make it clear that both actual knowledge
and 'willful blindness' fall within the definition of the term 'acquiescence.'").
74. See Gomez-Zuluaga v. Att'y Gen., 527 F.3d 330, 350 (3d Cir. 2008)
(holding that the Torture Convention as interpreted by Congress requires only
"that the government in question is willfully blind to such activities" (quoting
Silva-Rengifo v. Att'y Gen., 473 F.3d 58 (3d Cir. 2007))); Zheng, 332 F.3d at
1196 ("One of the 'understandings' in the Senate resolution of ratification of the
Convention Against Torture was that acquiescence of a public official requires
'awareness' and not 'knowledge' or 'willful acceptance."); Ontunez-Tursios v.
Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 341, 354-55 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding that willful blindness is
sufficient to show acquiescence under the Torture Convention).
75. See cases cited supra note 74. While these cases differ from an ATS case
2010] 1289
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
The following analysis will show how crucial this definition of
the required level of state involvement is in assessing the
ability to sue private contractors for their acts of torture
committed while working for the U.S. government.
E. Defenses that Private Contractors Sued for Torture Under
the ATS May Assert
1. Immunity Through Exceptions to the Federal Tort
Claims Act
The U.S. government enjoys sovereign immunity,
shielding it from civil suits.7 6 The FTCA creates a waiver of
the government's sovereign immunity, granting federal
district courts jurisdiction to hear suits against the United
States for torts committed by its employees while acting
within the scope of their employment.7  Under the Federal
Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of
1988, vs commonly known as the Westfall Act, which amended
the FTCA, the Attorney General certifies whether the
employee/defendant was acting within the scope of his or her
employment at the time of the alleged act giving rise to the
lawsuit. If the employee acted within the scope of
employment, the United States substitutes itself for the
employee as the defendant, and the lawsuit becomes a suit
against the United States under the FTCA.8 0 This effectively
shields the employee from liability.8 1
because the plaintiff is not trying to show that a defendant has committed
torture-which would be the case in litigation under the ATS-but instead show
that there is a risk of torture if sent back, the circuit courts' reading of
Congress's intended meaning of "acquiescence" is still instructive and should be
applicable in ATS cases as well.
76. See, e.g., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994)
("Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its
agencies from suit.").
77. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2006).
78. Id. § 2679.
79. See id. § 2679(d)(1) ("Upon certification by the Attorney General that the
defendant employee was acting within the scope of his office or employment at
the time of the incident out of which the claim arose, any civil action or
proceeding commenced upon such claim in a United States district court shall
be deemed an action against the United States under the provisions of this title
and all references thereto, and the United States shall be substituted as the
party defendant.").
80. Id.
81. See id. § 2679(b)(1) ("Any other civil action or proceeding for money
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The Westfall Act's legislative history strongly suggests its
purpose was to provide immunity to government employees
for acts of negligence or poor judgment, not for criminal acts
or egregious conduct.8 2 It is, therefore, highly unlikely that
the Westfall Act ever intended grave human rights violations
to be within the scope of employment. 83
While the FTCA provides a limited waiver of sovereign
immunity, the waiver is subject to several important
exceptions.84 Two of these exceptions are relevant to the
factual situations discussed in this comment-the foreign
country exception85 and the combatant activities exception.
8 6
A third provision, known as the independent contractor
exception, is not really an exception to the waiver of
immunity, but in practice acts as such by restricting to which
employees the FTCA applies. s7
The foreign country exception excludes "claim[s] arising
in a foreign country" from the waiver of sovereign
immunity. 88 The Supreme Court clarified in Sosa that the
foreign country exception applies whenever the injury giving
rise to the suit occurs outside the United States, regardless of
whether the acts were planned in, or directed from, the
United States. 9 Tortious acts committed in Iraq or another
damages arising out of or relating to the same subject matter against the
employee or the employee's estate is precluded without regard to when the act
or omission occurred.").
82. STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 27, at 291-92 (arguing that "[tihe Westfall
Act's legislative history indicates that the Act was not intended to apply to those
who committed 'egregious torts'" (quoting H.R. REP. No. 100-700, at 5 (1988),
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5945, 5949)). But see Rasul v. Myers, 512 F.3d
644, 658-59 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that alleged acts of torture against
detainees at Guantanamo Bay were within scope of employment of military
personnel), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 763 (2008).
83. See STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 27, at 291-96; see also discussion infra
Part IV.B. 1.
84. 28 U.S.C. § 2680.
85. Id. § 2680(k) ("The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this
title shall not apply to ... (k) Any claim arising in a foreign country.").
86. Id. § 2680(j) ("The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this
title shall not apply to... (0) Any claim arising out of the combatant activities of
the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war.").
87. See id. § 2671 ("ITIhe term 'Federal agency' .. . does not include any
contractor with the United States.").
88. Id. § 2680(k).
89. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004) ("[T]he FTCA's
foreign country exception bars all claims based on any injury suffered in a
foreign country, regardless of where the tortious act or omission occurred.").
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foreign country by a U.S. government employee acting within
the scope of his or her employment fall within the foreign
country exception of the FTCA, even if the acts take place
inside a U.S.-controlled military base. 90 If a plaintiff sues a
government employee for tortious conduct, the United States
may substitute itself for the employee under the Westfall Act.
The United States can then claim sovereign immunity based
on the foreign country exception to the FTCA and, thereby,
both the employee and the government are effectively shield
from liability for the tortious conduct, leaving the victim with
no civil cause of action. 91
The combatant activities exception bars suits against the
federal government for "[a]ny claim arising out of the
combatant activities of the military or naval forces, or the
Coast Guard, during time of war."92 The rationale behind
this exception is that, during a time of war, the government
should not owe a duty of reasonable care to those it is
fighting.93 The private contractors discussed in this comment
were operating at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, which
arguably could be considered a "combat zone" and, thus, the
acts committed there could be labeled "combat activities."94
This exception also operates to shield both the employee and
the United States from suit.
The independent contractor exception differs from the
previous two exceptions in that it does not reinstate sovereign
immunity. Instead, it acts as a bar to substitution of the U.S.
90. See Richard Henry Seamon, U.S. Torture as a Tort, 37 RUTGERS L.J.
715, 735 (2006) ("[T]he foreign country exception would immunize the United
States for the torture that occurred at Abu Ghraib. Because the torture
occurred in a foreign country, a claim based on that torture arose in a foreign
country and falls within the exception. It does not matter whether the torture
was authorized in Washington, D.C."); see also United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S.
217, 219-22 (1949) (holding that the foreign country exception of the FTCA
applied to acts that occurred at a military base in Canada, which was held by
the United States on a ninety-nine-year lease).
91. See Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 420 ("If, however,
an exception to the FTCA shields the United States from suit, the plaintiff may
be left without a tort action against any party.").
92. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j).
93. Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1337 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that
one purpose of the exception is that "during wartime encounters no duty of
reasonable care is owed to those against whom force is directed as a result of
authorized military action").
94. Seamon, supra note 90, at 734 ("[Ihe Abu Ghraib prison lies in an area
of active combat.").
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government for the contractor employee under the Westfall
Act. Under the FTCA, "employees of the government," who
are subject to substitution, include "officers or employees of
any federal agency."" The FTCA excludes any contractors
working for the United States from its definition of "federal
agency."96 A private contractor's employees working for the
U.S. government are, therefore, not considered employees of
the United States, and substitution under the Westfall Act is
barred.
97
The Supreme Court has held, however, that a private
contractor could potentially be considered a "federal agency"
under the FTCA if the government controlled the contractor's
day-to-day activity. 98 This is a high standard and requires
essentially absolute control.99 Courts should analyze the
facts of each case to determine whether the day-to-day
operations of the contractor were under such strict
government control that the independent contractor was, in
effect, a "federal agency."' 0 If that level of control exists, the
court would allow the government to substitute itself for the
contractor's employee under the Westfall Act, creating
immunity for the employee and potentially also the contractor
corporation, which makes it a very appealing defense.1 °1
95. 28 U.S.C. § 2671. The definition also includes other categories, which
are not relevant to a discussion about independent contractors.
96. Id.
97. See STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 27, at 328.
98. See United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 814-15 (1976) ("A critical
element in distinguishing an agency from a contractor is the power of the
Federal Government 'to control the detailed physical performance of the
contractor.' . . . [The question is not whether the [contractor, in this case a
community action agency,] receives federal money and must comply with
federal standards and regulations, but whether [the contractor's] day-to-day
operations are supervised by the Federal Government."); Logue v. United
States, 412 U.S. 521, 529-32 (1973) (finding insufficient day-to-day control by
the government over a county jail contracted by the federal government to
house federal prisoners to consider it a federal agency, stating that "we are not
persuaded that employees of a contractor with the Government, whose physical
performance is not subject to governmental supervision, are to be treated as
'acting on behalf of a federal agency simply because they are performing tasks
that would otherwise be performed by salaried employees of the Government").
99. See STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 27, at 328 n.77.
100. See cases cited supra note 98.
101. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1) (describing the process by which the employee
is substituted for the U.S. government as the sole remaining defendant). Under
the FTCA, district courts must apply "the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred," id. § 1346(b), which is generally based on the respondeat
superior laws of that place or the Restatement of Agency. See STEPHENS ET AL.,
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2. Preemption from Suit Under the Government
Contractor Defense
The government contractor defense is a common law
defense. It was developed to limit the financial impact on the
U.S. government from state tort law claims brought against
government contractors manufacturing equipment for the
U.S. military. 10 2 The Supreme Court held in Boyle v. United
Technologies Corp. that imposing state tort law liability on a
government contractor for design defects in military
equipment approved by the United States would lead to
higher costs for the contractor, which would pass the costs on
to the government. 103 This would create an indirect financial
liability for the government by increasing the cost of
procuring military equipment, a result the discretionary
function exception to the FTCA's waiver of sovereign
immunity intended to prevent.104 The discretionary function
exception restores the sovereign immunity for any claim
"based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the
part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government,
whether or not the discretion involved be abused." °5
In Boyle, the Court addressed whether the plaintiffs
could hold a government contractor liable in a wrongful death
supra note 27, at 291-97 (discussing the implications of applying either rules of
respondeat superior or rules under Restatement of Agency to determine scope of
employment). It is possible that even if a private contractor's employee is found
to be under day-to-day control of the government, this may not eliminate all
liability for the private contractor corporation under the theory of respondeat
superior. An analysis of this topic is beyond the scope of this comment. For a
thorough analysis of this issue, see Casto, supra note 6, at 694-99.
102. See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 511-12 (1988);
STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 27, at 328-29. The government contractor defense
is an affirmative defense that places the burden of establishing the elements of
the defense on the contractor. Ibrahim 1, 391 F. Supp. 2d 10, 18 (D.D.C. 2005).
103. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511-12 ("The financial burden of judgments against
the contractors would ultimately be passed through, substantially if not totally,
to the United States itself, since defense contractors will predictably raise their
prices to cover, or to insure against, contingent liability for the Government-
ordered designs.").
104. Id. at 511 (equating suits against government contractors with suits
against the government that would "produce the same effect sought to be
avoided by the FTCA exemption").
105. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2006); see Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511 ("Military
equipment to be used by our Armed Forces is assuredly a discretionary function
within the meaning of [the FTCA exception in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)].").
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action arising from the crash of a military helicopter. 106 The
Court articulated a three-part test, holding that state law
claims would be preempted "when (1) the United States
approved reasonably precise specifications; (2) the equipment
conformed to those specifications; and (3) the supplier warned
the United States about the dangers in the use of the
equipment that were known to the supplier but not to the
United States." 107 The Court held that, a finding of liability
under state tort law for a government contractor under those
circumstances would conflict with federal interests in the
procurement of military equipment and be contrary to the
rationale behind the discretionary function exception to the
FTCA. 108
The Boyle Court limited its holding to the particular facts
of the case, that is, state tort law liability for design defects in
military equipment manufactured by a defense contractor. 109
Many courts have followed this approach, narrowly limiting
this defense to contractors that manufacture military
equipment.1 0 Some courts, however, have expanded the
government contractor defense."' In Hudgens v. Bell
Helicopters/ Textron, the Eleventh Circuit applied the Boyle
rationale to a service contract between a private contractor
and the Army and found the government contractor defense
warranted in that instance. 1 2 The court modified the Boyle
106. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 502-03, 509 ("This case requires us to decide when a
contractor providing military equipment to the Federal Government can be held
liable under state tort law for injury caused by a design defect.").
107. Id. at 512.
108. Id. at 511 ("[Plermitting 'second-guessing' of these judgments through
state tort suits against contractors would produce the same effect sought to be
avoided by the FTCA exemption." (citation omitted)).
109. Id. at 502 ("This case requires us to decide when a contractor providing
military equipment to the Federal Government can be held liable under state
tort law for injury caused by a design defect.").
110. See, e.g., Snell v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 107 F.3d 744, 746 n.1
(9th Cir. 1997) ("In the Ninth Circuit [the government contractor defense] is
only available to contractors who design and manufacture military
equipment."); Mitchell v. Lone Star Ammunition, Inc., 913 F.2d 242, 245 (5th
Cir. 1990) ("[T~he government contractor defense only applies in cases of
defective design, not in cases of defective manufacture.").
111. STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 27, at 329.
112. Hudgens v. Bell Helicopters/Textron, 328 F.3d 1329, 1334 (11th Cir.
2003) ("We would be exceedingly hard-pressed to conclude that the unique
federal interest recognized in Boyle, as well as the potential for significant
conflict with state law, are not likewise manifest in the present case.").
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three-part test113 and concluded that the same reasoning that
applies to a contract for the manufacturing of military
equipment would apply to a contract for the maintenance of
military equipment." 4
Recently in Saleh v. Titan Corp. (Saleh II),"' the D.C.
Circuit dramatically expanded the government contractor
defense to any private service contractor that, during
wartime, is "integrated into combatant activities over which
the military retains command authority."116  Instead of
relying on the discretionary function exception of the FTCA
as the Boyle Court had done, the D.C. Circuit focused on the
combatant activities exception and found that unique federal
interests were implicated that warranted preemption of state
tort law liability." 7 The court limited the applicability of the
defense to situations where the military retains command
authority and operational control over the contractor
employee, although the control does not have to be
exclusive." 8  The requirement of command authority and
operational control is akin to the day-to-day control
requirement articulated by United States v. Orleans"9 and
113. Id. at 1335 ("[W~e rearticulate the defense's three elements to foreclose
liability under state tort law if (1) the United States approved reasonably
precise maintenance procedures; (2) DynCorp's performance of maintenance
conformed to those procedures; and (3) DynCorp warned the United States
about the dangers in reliance on the procedures that were known to DynCorp
but not to the United States.").
114. Id. at 1334 ("Holding a contractor liable under state law for
conscientiously maintaining military aircraft according to specified procedures
would threaten government officials' discretion in precisely the same manner as
holding contractors liable for departing from design specifications.").
115. Saleh 11, 580 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2009). This case came to the D.C.
Circuit on appeal by both the plaintiffs and defendant CACI after the district
court in Ibrahim 11, 556 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2007), granted Titan's motion for
summary judgment based on the government contractor defense, but denied
CACI the same motion. Saleh 1!, 580 F.3d at 4.
116. Saleh 1!, 580 F.3d at 9.
117. Id. at 7 ("[Tlhe policy embodied by the combatant activities exception is
simply the elimination of tort from the battlefield.... And the policies of the
combatant activities exception are equally implicated whether the alleged
tortfeasor is a soldier or a contractor engaging in combatant activities at the
behest of the military and under the military's control."). In a strong dissent,
Judge Garland argued that the expansion of the defense was unprecedented
and that holding the private contract liable for the alleged violations did not
conflict with any unique federal interest. Id. at 23-24 (Garland, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 8-10 (rejecting as too strict the district court's test in Ibrahim 11,
556 F. Supp. 2d at 5, which required "exclusive operational control").
119. United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807 (1976).
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Logue v. United States121 for determining whether a private
contractor is a federal agency under the FTCA.12 1 Thus,
although there are strong arguments that the expansion to
include the combatant activities exception is unjustified, the
key aspect for purposes of this comment's analysis is that the
level of control by the military over the private contractor
must be extremely high before the defense applies.
The unprecedented D.C. Circuit expansion appears to
bring the government contractor defense closer to cases
involving claims of torture under the ATS. In fact, the court
indicates in dicta that if the defense preempts state tort law
claims, it should also preempt tort claims based on
international law. 22  The policy behind the Boyle Court's
holding-that a government contractor should not be held
liable for tortious acts under state law if such liability would
present a significant conflict with unique federal policy or
interests 123-- does not support this argument. 124 Under Boyle,
state tort law should only be preempted when the defense
contractor would be unable to comply with both its obligations
under a federal contract and state tort law. 121
A private military contractor accused of committing
torture and seeking to claim the government contractor
defense would have to make two difficult arguments. First,
the contractor must demonstrate that the defense extends
beyond the preemption of state tort law to also include the
preemption of the law of nations. 126 Despite the D.C. Circuit's
statement in dicta, this would constitute an unprecedented
120. Logue v. United States, 412 U.S. 521 (1973).
121. See supra Part II.E.1.
122. Saleh 11, 580 F.3d at 16.
123. See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988) ("In sum, we
are of the view that state law which holds Government contractors liable for
design defects in military equipment does in some circumstances present a
'significant conflict' with federal policy and must be displaced."); see also
Hudgens v. Bell Helicopters/Textron, 328 F.3d 1329, 1334 (11th Cir. 2003)
("[Tihe question is whether subjecting a contractor to liability under state tort
law would create a significant conflict with a unique federal interest.").
124. Saleh 1H, 580 F.3d at 23 (Garland, J., dissenting) ("Boyle has never been
applied to protect a contractor from liability resulting from the contractor's
violation of federal law and policy. And there is no dispute that the conduct
alleged, if true, violated both.").
125. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 509 (stating that state law would not be pre-empted if
"[tihe contractor could comply with both its contractual obligations and the
state-prescribed duty of care").
126. See id. at 502 (limiting the holding to preemption of state law).
2010] 1297
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
expansion of the defense. Second, the contractor must show
that a federal policy or interest significant conflicts with
upholding the international prohibition against torture,
which the United States has supported by ratifying the
Torture Convention and by enacting criminal and civil
statutes prohibiting the practice. 12 Thus, even if the defense
were to be expanded beyond preemption of state tort law,
arguably there is no unique federal interest that conflicts
with holding private contractors liable for committing torture.
F. Government Contractor Cases in the District of Columbia:
The Titan Cases
In 2009, the D.C. Circuit Court heard Saleh H, a case
concerning human rights violations allegedly committed by
two government contractors at the Abu Ghraib prison in
Iraq. 128 The appeal stemmed from two cases in the District
Court of the District of Columbia, Ibrahim v. Titan Corp.
(Ibrahim /)129 and Saleh v. Titan Corp. (Saleh ),130 which
addressed government contractors' liability under the ATS for
acts of torture. The two cases were based on virtually
identical facts: Iraqi nationals were allegedly tortured, raped,
assaulted, and killed, while detained at Abu Ghraib, by
employees of two private contractors, CACI and Titan.'31 At
the time, the U.S. military was in charge of Abu Ghraib and
the defendants were contracted to provide interrogation and
interpretation services at the prison. 132
In both cases, the plaintiffs sued the defendants under
the ATS, alleging torture in violation of the law of nations.
133
127. See supra note 5.
128. Saleh 1I, 580 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
129. Ibrahim I, 391 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C. 2005).
130. Saleh I, 436 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2006).
131. Id. at 57 ("[Tlhe factual allegations of the two cases, [Ibrahim I and
Saleh I] are virtually indistinguishable from one another."); Ibrahim I, 391 F.
Supp. 2d at 12-13 (stating the facts of the case).
132. Ibrahim I, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 12 (stating that defendants CACI
International, Inc., CACI Incorporated-Federal, and CACI N.V. were employed
by the U.S. military as interrogators, and defendant Titan Corporation was
employed by the U.S. military to provide interpreters); see Sean D. Murphy,
U.S. Abuse of Iraqi Detainees at Abu Ghraib Prison, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 591, 593
(2004) ("After the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003, U.S. military forces
established and operated a series of detention facilities there, the largest of
which was at the Abu Ghraib prison outside Baghdad.").
133. See Saleh 1, 436 F. Supp. 2d at 57 (claiming that torture by private
parties acting under the color of law is a violation of the law of nations as
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In addition, the plaintiffs asserted state common law claims
of assault and battery, wrongful death, false imprisonment,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, conversion, and
negligence.13 4  The court dismissed the ATS claims in both
Saleh I and Ibrahim I, leaving only a small number of
common law tort claims. 135 The two cases were consolidated
for discovery and returned to the district court in 2007 as
Ibrahim v. Titan (Ibrahim I!).131 Stripped of any ATS claims,
the court in Ibrahim H primarily focused on determining the
factual basis for the defendants' assertion that the remaining
state tort law claims should be preempted by the government
contractor defense. 137
One significant difference between the Ibrahim I and
Saleh I cases was the plaintiffs' theories behind the claim
that defendant had committed torture. In Ibrahim I, the
court dismissed the plaintiffs' claim of torture committed by a
private contractor, holding that the definition of torture that
is actionable under the ATS as a violation of the law of
nations only applies to official state torture. 138  The court
cited to the D.C. Circuit precedent in Sanchez-Espinoza v.
Reagan 13 and Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic"' in support
of its holding that the law of nations does not apply to actions
by private parties.' 4 ' The D.C. Circuit, however, decided both
Sanchez-Espinoza and Tel-Oren prior to the Supreme Court's
decision in Sosa and was, therefore, not guided by the Sosa
standard. The Ibrahim I court took note of Sosa, but did not
consider whether the defendant's acts met the Torture
described in the ATS); Ibrahim 1, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 13-14 (claiming that
torture by a private party is a violation of the law of nations as described in the
ATS).
134. Saleh I, 436 F. Supp. 2d at 57; Ibrahim I, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 13.
135. Ibrahim 11, 556 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2-3 (D.D.C. 2007), affd in part, rev'd in
part sub nom. Saleh 11, 580 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
136. Id.
137. Id. (addressing common law tort allegations and possible defenses under
FTCA and the common law government contractor defense); see infra Part
IV.B.2.
138. Ibrahim 1, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 14-15 (questioning "whether the law of
nations applies to private actors like the defendants in the present case" and
holding that "it is not actionable under the Alien Tort Statute's grant of
jurisdiction, as a violation of the law of nations").
139. Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
140. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
141. See Ibrahim 1, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 14 nn.1-3 (analyzing the court's
precedent regarding causes of action under the ATS for private actions).
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Convention's definition of torture and whether that definition
is the proper one to use for a cause of action of torture under
the ATS pursuant to Sosa.12  Guided by the Ibrahim I
decision, the plaintiffs in Saleh I used an alternative
argument to hold the private contractor liable for torture
under the ATS.14 3  In footnote three of its decision, the
Ibrahim I court cited Judge Edwards' opinion in Tel-Oren,
that "torture by private parties acting under 'color of law'...
would be actionable under the ATS." 1' Thus, the plaintiffs in
Saleh I asserted that CACI and Titan acted under color of law
when committing torture against them and, therefore, had
committed a violation of the law of nations under the ATS. 145
The Saleh I court, however, rejected this argument stating
that Sanchez-Espinoza holds that private action cannot
create a cause of action under the ATS. 146 Again, the court
did not analyze whether the scope of the internationally
recognized definition of torture would include the acts
allegedly committed by the defendants as required by the
Sosa standard. Instead, the court concluded that Sosa had
not overturned the controlling standard as defined by
Sanchez-Espinoza. 1
47
In Saleh 1, 148 the D.C. Circuit court conducted a similar
analysis to that performed by the district court in Ibrahim I
142. As will be developed further in the analysis, the Ibrahim I court simply
concluded that a private actor cannot commit torture. See infra Part IV.A.1. To
come to this conclusion, however, the court relied on old D.C. Circuit precedent
instead of the Sosa standard, which allows courts to create new causes of action
for violation of a law of nations that is a widely accepted and clearly defined
international norm. See STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 27, at 54 (interpreting the
Sosa standard as requiring a violation to be "of a widely accepted, clearly
defined international norm"). This comment argues that, under the Sosa
standard, the court must focus on the scope of the applicable international law
violation and perform a factual analysis to see if the acts of the private party
conform to that definition. In this case, the acts must conform to the definition
of torture under the Torture Convention, which is the internationally recognized
definition of torture. See supra note 69.
143. Saleh I, 436 F. Supp. 2d 55, 57 (D.D.C. 2006).
144. Ibrahim 1, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 14 n.3.
145. Saleh I, 436 F. Supp. 2d at 57.
146. Id. at 58 ("Sanchez-Espinoza makes it clear that there is no middle
ground between private action and government action, at least for purposes of
the Alien Tort Statute.").
147. Id. at 57. The court also emphasized the Sosa Court's "admonition that
lower federal courts should be extremely cautious about discovering new
offenses among the law of nations." Id. at 57-58.
148. Saleh 11, 580 F.3d 1, 3-4 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
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and Saleh I and concluded, citing both Sanchez-Espinoza and
Tel-Oren, that a private party cannot commit torture. 149
Interestingly, the court cited parts of the Torture
Convention's definition of torture to support the argument
that private parties cannot commit torture, but in doing so
distorted the true definition of the crime. 150  Instead of
quoting the entire definition of torture, which includes that
the "consent or acquiescence of a public official" is sufficient
to constitute torture, 15' the court selectively cited the Torture
Convention as "limiting [the] definition of torture to [only]
acts by 'a public official or other person acting in an official
capacity.'"152
Much of the remaining litigation in Ibrahim I and If
related to state tort law claims and centered on the amount of
control the U.S. military had asserted over the contractor's
employees. 153 The issue was whether state tort law claims
against the defendants should be preempted under the
government contractor defense because, as the defendants'
asserted, their employees were, in effect, agents of the
government and not the contractor corporations. 5 4 Ruling on
defendants' motion for summary judgment, the Ibrahim II
court held that Titan's employees performed their duties
under the exclusive operational control of the military, while
CACI retained significant authority to manage its
employees. 5 5  Therefore, the court granted the motion for
summary judgment for Titan, but not for CACI, preempting
all of the plaintiffs' remaining state tort law claims against
Titan.5 6 As mentioned earlier, the D.C. Circuit reversed the
district court as to the CACI decision and upheld the Titan
decision, thus granting both defendants' summary judgment
motions. 157
After Sosa, courts should apply the Ibrahim If court's
149. See id. at 15.
150. See id.
151. Torture Convention, supra note 5, art. 1.
152. Saleh 11, 580 F.3d at 15.
153. See Ibrahim H, 556 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8-10 (D.D.C. 2007), affd in part, rev'd
in part sub nom. Saleh 11, 580 F.3d 1; Ibrahim 1, 391 F. Supp. 2d 10, 19 (D.D.C.
2005) (discussing defendants' assertion that "their employees were essentially
on 'loan' to the military [and] integrated into the military hierarchy").
154. Ibrahim H, 556 F. Supp. 2d at 2.
155. Id. at 10.
156. Id. at 10-11.
157. Saleh 11, 580 F.3d at 17.
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thorough analysis of the level of government control over the
private contractor to determine if a private party has
committed torture under the Torture Convention's definition.
The particular facts of these cases support a finding that the
acts of the private contractors met the Torture Convention's
definition of torture because the U.S. military retained
command authority over both defendants and, thus, either
consented or, at the very least, acquiesced to the acts
committed by Titan and CACI employees.
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEGAL ISSUES: THE STATE
ACTION DILEMMA-TORTURE REQUIRES STATE ACTION, BUT
STATE ACTION MAY GRANT PRIVATE CONTRACTORS AN
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
As the Titan cases illustrate,'58 the use of private
contractors in the U.S. military has led to increased concern
over how to hold private contractors accountable for human
rights abuses committed while working for the United States.
A violation of international human rights, such as acts of
torture, typically requires some government involvement.' 59
Governments, including the United States, however, enjoy
general sovereign immunity, shielding them from civil suits
for tortious acts committed by its officials and employees. 60
The United States has waived much of that sovereign
immunity under the FTCA, although exceptions reinstate the
sovereign immunity in some cases. 161  Substantial
government involvement in a private contractor's acts could
potentially entitle the private contractor to the same
immunity afforded the U.S. government or to the common law
government contractor defense. Thus, the problem is that
some government involvement is required to bring a cause of
action for torture under the ATS, but too much government
involvement could immunize the private party from liability
altogether. 162
158. Saleh 11, 580 F.3d 1; Ibrahim 11, 556 F. Supp. 2d 1; Saleh 1, 436 F. Supp.
2d 55 (D.D.C. 2006); Ibrahim 1, 391 F. Supp. 2d 10.
159. See supra Part II.D.
160. See, e.g., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994).
161. See supra notes 77, 84-86 and accompanying text; see also Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 700 (2004) (addressing the foreign country
exception under 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k)).
162. In dicta the Saleh II court acknowledged this dilemma, but ignored the
difference between the two that this comment highlights, stating: "Of course,
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The solution to this problem, particularly in cases of
torture, is recognizing that there is a significant gap between
the required level and substance of government involvement.
To allow a private contractor to assert sovereign immunity or
the government contractor defenses, courts require almost
absolute government control of the contractor, while the
definition of torture only requires that the government official
consented or acquiesced to the private contractor's acts.
Accepting that one size does not fit all when considering the
impact of private contractors acting with government
involvement will enable plaintiffs to hold private contractors,
who operated in this gap, liable under the ATS for torture.
IV. ANALYSIS: EFFECTIVELY SUING PRIVATE CONTRACTORS
FOR TORTURE UNDER THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE-
INTERPRETING THE DIFFERENT ASPECTS OF STATE ACTION
A. Private Parties Can Be Held Liable for Torture Under the
ATS
1. Applying the Sosa Standard
In Sosa, the Supreme Court announced that the ATS was
a purely jurisdictional statute, but federal courts have
common law powers to create new causes of action for a
limited number of international law violations that rest on an
international norm that is "widely accepted and clearly
defined." 163 After Sosa, a court analyzing a violation of the
law of nations in an ATS claim must apply the Sosa
standard. 16
The Sosa Court, as well as other courts, has recognized
torture as a valid cause of action under the ATS. 165  The
plaintiffs are unwilling to assert that the contractors are state actors. Not only
would such an admission make deep inroads against their arguments with
respect to the preemption defense, it would virtually concede that the
contractors have sovereign immunity." Saleh 11, 580 F.3d at 15.
163. STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 27, at 50; see Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725 ("[W~e
think courts should require any claim based on the present-day law of nations
to rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and
defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century
paradigms we have recognized.").
164. Casto, supra note 51, at 635-36 ([A1ll analyses of ATS litigation must
flow from Sosa's guidelines.").
165. See supra Part II.C.
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crucial question is whether the definition of torture makes it
possible for a private party to commit the crime.'66 The D.C.
Circuit in Saleh If stated that there is no settled
international norm that recognizes torture committed by
private actors. 167 To support this, the court incorrectly cited
the Torture Convention as "limiting [the] definition of torture
to acts by 'a public official or other person acting in an official
capacity. ' 168 In fact, the Torture Convention makes an act
torture if it is "inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person
acting in an official capacity." 16
9
In rejecting the plaintiffs' torture claims, the Ibrahim I
court should not have relied solely on Tel-Oren and Sanchez-
Espinoza, which predate Sosa, to determine whether a non-
state actor can commit torture, and categorically conclude
that it cannot because torture is reserved for acts committed
by state actors. 70 Instead, the Ibrahim I court should have
analyzed the facts underlying the plaintiffs' complaint and, as
required by Sosa, determined whether the allegation-in this
case torture by a non-state actor-amounted to a violation of
a "norm of international character accepted by the civilized
world and defined with [clear] specificity."'71 The issue is not
whether a private party can commit torture, but whether
there has been a violation of the international prohibition
against torture, which is widely accepted and clearly defined.
The Torture Convention provides the generally accepted
definition of torture under international law.'72 Under the
Torture Convention, torture is not an exclusive state or
official action; a private party can, if acting "with the consent
or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an
official capacity," 73 commit torture. 17  District courts must
166. This comment does not address the question of what acts amount to
torture, but focuses solely on whether acts that would amount to torture are
considered torture if committed by a private party acting with some state
involvement.
167. Saleh 11, 580 F.3d at 15.
168. Id.
169. Torture Convention, supra note 5, art. 1 (emphasis added).
170. Id.
171. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004).
172. See STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 27, at 141 ("The Torture Convention
contains the generally accepted international law definition of torture .... "); see
also supra note 69; discussion supra Part II.D.
173. Torture Convention, supra note 5, art. 1.
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follow the Sosa directive and should use this definition to
assess whether or not a defendant has committed torture,
independent of whether the law of nations in general applies
to private parties.
2. Other Courts Have Found Private Parties Capable of
Violating the Law of Nations
Courts have found private parties capable of violating the
law of nations. In Jama v. United States INS (Jama /), 175 the
district court denied the defendant contractor's motion to
dismiss, holding that a private contractor who had contracted
with the INS to run a detention facility for asylum seekers
was a state actor because the private contractor was
performing governmental services. 176 The plaintiffs sued the
private contractor under the ATS alleging mistreatment by
the prison guards, who were employees of the contractor,
including cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. 177 The
Jama I court determined that, because the private contractor
was effectively a state actor, its employees could be held
liable for violation of the law of nations under the ATS. 7 1
The case returned to the district court six years later in Jama
II on defendant's motion to dismiss the remaining claims. 179
By the time Jama H was decided, the district court had the
guidance of Sosa to help determine whether the alleged
violation of the law of nations created a cause of action under
the ATS. 180 The district court held that the individual acts of
the guards did not meet the rigorous Sosa standard, but there
was sufficient basis for the plaintiffs to establish an ATS
claim against the contractor and its officers for the collective
acts of all the guards employed by the contractor. 181
174. Marchesi, supra note 71, at 211.
175. Jama I, 22 F. Supp. 2d 353 (D.N.J. 1998).
176. Id. at 365-66 ("Thus they were state actors and it is unnecessary to
address the question raised in Kadic, namely the extent to which non-state
actors can be sued under the ATCA.").
177. Id. at 358-59.
178. Id. at 363 ("[The contractor's employees] were acting under contract
with the INS and were performing governmental services. Thus they were state
actors .... ).
179. Jama H, 343 F. Supp. 2d 338 (D.N.J. 2004).
180. Id. at 357 ("The Supreme Court's June 2004 opinion in [Sosal requires
that this court's rulings in its 1998 Opinion concerning the ATCA be revisited.").
181. Id. at 360-61 (granting summary judgment in favor of the individual
guards employed by the contractor, but denying it for the contractor corporation
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In Jama H, the acts of an individual contractor's
employees did not amount to a violation of the law of nations
under the ATS because the severity and extent of the
individual violations did not meet the requirements under
Sosa; the court, however, did not preclude the possibility that
an employee could commit such a violation. 182 By finding that
the contractor and its officers could be held liable for the
collective violation of all its employees because of the
collective severity of the acts, and comparing the acts of the
employees with the torture that took place in Filartiga, the
court sent a clear signal-private contractors can violate the
law of nations if the conduct is severe enough and there is
sufficient state involvement. 18 3  Therefore, pursuant to the
Sosa standard, courts have the power to create new causes of
action under the ATS for these violations.
The Torture Convention's requirement that the party act
with "consent or acquiescence of a public official or other
person acting in an official capacity" is arguably analogous to
the requirement in the TVPA and other federal statutes that
a party act under "color of law." This is evident from
Congress's use of the latter term when it codified the Torture
Convention.8 4 Prior to Sosa, the Second Circuit concluded in
Kadic v. Karadzic that "[tihe 'color of law' jurisprudence of 42
U.S.C. § 1983 is a relevant guide to whether a defendant has
engaged in official action for purposes of jurisdiction under
the Alien Tort Act."1 85 In reversing the lower court's denial of
subject matter jurisdiction under the ATS, the Second Circuit
held that "a] private individual acts under color of law within
and its officers).
182. Id. (comparing the severity of the torture in Filartiga to the less serious
individual acts of the contractor's employees).
183. Id. ("[The contractor] is, of course, responsible for the conditions in the
Facility and, by virtue of the doctrine of respondeat superior, for the actions of
the guards and its other employees on duty there .... [Tihe court concludes that
there is evidence on the basis of which the Jama H plaintiffs could establish an
ATCA claim against [the contractor and its officers].").
184. In codifying the Torture Convention, Congress chose the wording "color
of law" instead of "consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person
acting in an official capacity" contained in the Torture Convention. See Torture
Convention Implementation Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2006). For that reason, the
two terms should be considered as interchangeable.
185. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 245 (2d Cir. 1995). The court held that
Radovan Karadzic, the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, could be held liable for
international law violations requiring state action because "he acted in concert
with the former Yugoslavia." Id.
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the meaning of section 1983 when he acts together with state
officials or with significant state aid."18 6 The court's holding,
therefore, lends strong support to the view that a private
individual can violate the Torture Convention and that
liability is not limited only to acts directly committed by state
actors.
From the Torture Convention's definition of torture, it is
clear that a state actor does not need to be actively involved
for a private party to commit torture-mere acquiescence by
the state actor is sufficient.1 7  Several circuit courts have
addressed the meaning of the Torture Convention's
"acquiescence," although in a somewhat different but
applicable context. 188  Courts have consistently found that
acquiescence does not require the public official to have
actual knowledge of the specific torture; awareness, including
willful blindness, that the victim is being tortured is
sufficient. 8 9 This interpretation of the term "acquiescence"
should also be used by courts facing a claim of torture under
the ATS. Courts applying this interpretation would have to
determine whether a public official either had knowledge of or
was willfully blind to the acts committed by the private party
that amounted to torture. If so, the private party's acts would
amount to torture under the Torture Convention and,
therefore, warrant the creation of a cause of action under the
ATS.
3. The Titan Cases, and the Curious Absence of an
Application of the Sosa Standard
The Ibrahim I court never addressed whether the private
contractor defendants had acted as state actors or under
"color of law" because none of the plaintiffs made that
claim. 90  Instead, the question for the court was solely
186. Id.; see also Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 104 (2d
Cir. 2000) ("More recently, we held in Kadic that the ATCA reaches the conduct
of private parties provided that their conduct is undertaken under the color of
state authority or violates a norm of international law that is recognized as
extending to the conduct of private parties."(citation omitted)).
187. Marchesi, supra note 71, at 211.
188. See discussion supra Part II.D.
189. See cases cited supra note 74.
190. Ibrahim I, 391 F. Supp. 2d 10, 14 n.3 (D.D.C. 2005) (stating that the
only plaintiff who had asserted that the defendants were acting under color of
law subsequently withdrew that assertion).
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whether the defendants had committed torture as private
actors. 191 Therefore, the court easily dismissed the claim of
torture, holding that the law of nations does not apply to a
private contractor under the D.C. Circuit precedent. 192 The
likely reason for the absence of a color of law claim was
plaintiffs' fear that the court would hold that "if defendants
were acting as agents of the state, they would have sovereign
immunity under Sanchez-Espinoza."93 The Saleh If court
repeated this argument in dicta and, without providing much
analysis to support it, stated that "[o]f course, plaintiffs are
unwilling to assert that the contractors are state actors. Not
only would such an admission make deep inroads against
their arguments with respect to the preemption defense, it
would virtually concede that the contractors have sovereign
immunity."194 This conclusion fails to consider the nuances of
the Torture Convention's definition of torture,' 95 which makes
it clear that the plaintiffs could have asserted that defendants
had committed torture under that definition without
"virtually conced[ing] that the contractors have sovereign
immunity."9 6 This is the precise tension that can be resolved
by recognizing that the required state involvement differs for
torture and sovereign immunity.
The key question after Sosa is not whether the law of
nations applies to a private actor, but whether the facts of the
claim indicate that the private actor's conduct amounted to
torture as internationally defined in the Torture
Convention. 197  Had the plaintiffs in Ibrahim I decided to
assert that the defendants had acted with some level of
consent or acquiescence of military personnel at Abu Ghraib,
the judge should have determined whether the defendants'
acts met the Torture Convention's definition of torture, and
not simply concluded that private parties can never commit
191. Id. at 14.
192. Id. (stating that in the D.C. Circuit the law of nations does not apply to
private actors).
193. Id. at 14 n.3.
194. Saleh 11, 580 F.3d 1, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
195. This is evident from the court's incomplete and inaccurate citation of the
Torture Convention's definition of torture. See supra text accompanying notes
150-52.
196. Saleh 11, 580 F.3d at 15.
197. See supra note 51 and text accompanying note 47.
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torture. 198 It is evident from reading the Saleh I decision that
the D.C. District Court did not examine the facts under the
applicable Sosa guidelines. 199 The district court had the
opportunity in Saleh I to determine whether the private
contractors had acted under color of law, but it simply
dismissed the claim by stating that "Sanchez-Espinoza makes
it clear that there is no middle ground between private action
and government action, at least for purposes of the Alien Tort
Statute."200 This conclusion is puzzling because it completely
fails to analyze the claim under the controlling Sosa
standard. 201 The Saleh I (and later the Saleh II) court relied
on precedent that had not determined whether the violation
asserted by the plaintiffs was of a widely accepted and clearly
defined international norm, which is the determination at the
core of the Sosa standard.0 2 Justice Scalia, sitting as Circuit
Court judge in the D.C. Circuit, had stated in Sanchez-
Espinoza that the law of nations "does not reach private, non-
state conduct."20 3 That is not the issue here, however. If the
private party is acting with the consent or acquiescence of a
state actor, as defined by the Torture Convention the act
meets the definition of torture and must be recognized as a
violation of the law of nations under Sosa.
In Ibrahim 11, the court determined that the private
contractors, Titan and CACI, were under extensive control by
the U.S. military.20 4 The court found that Titan employees
were "fully integrated into the military units" and were under
"direct command and exclusive operational control of military
198. Ibrahim 1, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 14. There is no indication from the court's
decision, however, that if given the opportunity, the judge would have
performed this analysis. See id. (relying on precedent in the D.C. Circuit to
conclude that torture can never be committed by private parties and never
addressing whether the private actor had met the definition of torture); see also
Saleh 11, 580 F.3d at 15 (repeating the same argument).
199. See Saleh 1, 436 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2006).
200. Id. at 58; see also Saleh 11, 580 F.3d at 15-16 (repeating the same
argument).
201. See Saleh 1, 436 F. Supp. 2d at 58.
202. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004); see also STEPHENS
ET AL., supra note 27, at 54 (articulating the Sosa standard as requiring a
violation to be "of a widely accepted, clearly defined international norm").
203. Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 206-07 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
204. Ibrahim 1!, 556 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9-10 (D.D.C. 2007) (presenting facts that
indicated that Titan employees were under almost complete control of the
military, and CACI employees might have been under dual chain of command,
one being military).
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personnel."20 5 This level of involvement by the military would
surely meet the standard of "consent or acquiescence" under
the Torture Convention. °6  According to several circuit
courts, acquiescence only means "willful blindness." °7 If a
private contractor's employee is "fully integrated" into the
military, as the court found Titan's employees to be, or even
just partially under the chain of command, as was the case for
CACI's employees, it would surely be impossible for the
employee to torture inmates to death without either the
consent or willful blindness of the military. Thus, if the
private contractor employees committed the acts under these
circumstances, they amounted to torture under the Torture
Convention and constitute a valid cause of action under the
ATS.
B. Defenses That Should Be Unavailable to Private
Contractors Who Commit Torture
1. Immunity Under the Federal Tort Claims Act
The FTCA creates a waiver of sovereign immunity and
provides subject matter jurisdiction for federal courts to hear
claims brought by plaintiffs against the United States for
torts. 20 8  The Westfall Act provides a process where the
government assumes responsibility under the FTCA for the
tortious acts of its employees if the acts are committed within
the scope of his or her employment. 20 9 The FTCA expressly
excludes private contractors, so the government can generally
not substitute itself for a government contractor's employee,
unless it asserts absolute control over the contractor's day-to-
day activity.21 ° This is certainly a tougher standard than the
one required to find "consent or acquiescence" under the
Torture Convention's definition of torture." Therefore, a
205. Id. at 10.
206. Torture Convention, supra note 5, art. 1.
207. See supra note 73-74.
208. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2006); see also supra Part II.E.1.
209. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1).
210. Id. § 2671; see discussion supra Part II.E.1.
211. STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 27, at 328 n.77 (arguing that the level of
control "may not be present even where the government exercises significant
control over implementation of the contract"). Certainly, under the many circuit
court definitions of "acquiescence" a significant level of control by the
government would meet the required awareness or willful blindness. See
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court performing a Sosa analysis under the Torture
Convention would find sufficient consent or acquiescence of a
government official long before it found that the government
control reached the level of day-to-day control required to
argue that the private contractor is "federal agency" under
the FTCA_ 212
The difference between the required state action under
the Torture Convention and the day-to-day control required
under Orleans and Logue is of utmost importance because the
former allows a plaintiff to hold a private contractor liable for
torture without the contractor being able to assert that
sovereign immunity shields it from liability. In Ibrahim I and
repeated in Saleh II, the court concluded that if the
defendants were to be found liable for torture they would
inevitably also enjoy sovereign immunity.2 13 After Sosa, this
conclusion is incorrect because the government involvement
required to constitute torture must be based on the Torture
Convention's definition, which does not require a public
official to impose a high level of day-to-day control over the
private actor for the acts to amount to torture.214
In addition, there is also a strong argument against
allowing the United States to substitute itself for the
employee under the Westfall Act in cases involving
intentional human rights violations.215 The Westfall Act was
"intended to shield federal workers from suits which arise out
of their performance of their official duties, not to give them
license to commit intentional torts in the office."216 Shielding
government employees or government contractors that
commit torture would be contrary to that intent.
The combatant activities exception 217 and the foreign
Gomez-Zuluaga v. Att'y Gen., 527 F.3d 330, 350 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that
acquiescence in the Torture Convention as interpreted by Congress does not
require the government to have actual knowledge of the torturous conduct,
willful blindness is sufficient).
212. See discussion supra Part II.E.1; cases cited supra note 98.
213. Saleh 11, 580 F.3d 1, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Ibrahim 1, 391 F. Supp. 2d 10,
14 n.3 (D.D.C. 2005) ("[Pllaintiffs cannot allege that conduct is state action for
jurisdictional purposes but private action for sovereign immunity purposes."
(citing Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 207 (D.C. Cir. 1985))).
214. See supra Part II.D-E.
215. STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 27, at 295-96.
216. Id. at 293 (quoting Rutofske v. Norman, No. 95-2038, 1997 WL 299382,
at *2 n.1 (6th Cir. June 4, 1997)).
217. 28 U.S.C. § 2680() (2006).
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country exception of the FTCA2 18 are only relevant if the
contractor is found to be a federal agency under the FTCA.219
An analysis of whether these two exceptions apply to these
cases is beyond the scope of this comment. The crucial point,
however, is that if either of these exceptions applies, and if
the government is able to substitute itself for the private
contractor's employee and claim sovereign immunity, it will
leave the plaintiff with no cause of action.
2. Government Contractor Defense
In Ibrahim 11, the district court held that the state tort
law claims against Titan were preempted by the government
contractor defense because Titan's employees were "under the
direct command and exclusive operational control of the
military chain of command."22 ° The circuit court in Saleh II
slightly broadened the test, finding the government
contractor defense applicable to CACI even though the
military control was not exclusive.22' Both courts' analyses
resemble the Orleans and Logue test of government's day-to-
day control over the contractor's activities, used to determine
whether the private contractor was a "federal agency."222
Under the FTCA, if a contractor's employee is found to be a
government employee, the United States can be substituted
for the employee only if it is found that the tortious act was
committed within the scope of the contractor's employment.2 23
Both the Ibrahim II and the Saleh I court avoided this
analysis under the FTCA by expanding the government
contractor defense beyond its original application. Here,
instead of basing the government contractor defense on the
218. Id. § 2680(k).
219. Id. § 2680(a) (limiting the scope of the FTCA to suits against "a federal
agency or an employee of the Government").
220. Ibrahim 11, 556 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9-10 (D.D.C. 2007) (allowing Titan to fall
within the combatant activities exception of the FTCA because its employees
were fully integrated into military units and received all orders from the
military and, therefore, the state tort claim against Titan was barred under the
government contractor defense).
221. Saleh 11, 580 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ("[The] 'exclusive operational
control' test does not protect the full measure of the federal interest embodied in
the combatant activities exception. Surely, unique and significant federal
interests are implicated in situations where operational control falls short of
exclusive.").
222. See cases cited supra note 98; supra Part IV.B.1.
223. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1).
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policies behind the discretionary function exception of the
FTCA as the Supreme Court did in Boyle, the courts based
the defense on the polices behind the combatant activities
exception. 224 Not only is this expansion unprecedented, 25 but
it also removes the Westfall Act's requirement that an
employee be immune from suit only if the tortious act was
within the scope of employment.226 "It thus grants private
contractors more protection than our soldiers and other
government employees receive" under the Westfall Act.227
The common law government contractor defense is
justified by the same policies that warrant exceptions to the
waiver of sovereign immunity under the FTCA-that state
tort law sometimes should not be allowed to conflict with
important and unique federal interests.228 In Boyle, the
Supreme Court held that preemption of state law "will occur
only where . . . a significant conflict exists between an
identifiable federal policy or interest and the operation of
state law, or the application of state law would frustrate
specific objectives of federal legislation."229 Courts should not
extend that reasoning to cases involving human rights
violations such as torture because there is no conflict between
a law prohibiting torture and a federal interest. While a
federal policy could be counter to a state product liability law,
it could not be counter to a norm of international law
recognized by the federal government. The U.S. government
has ratified the Torture Convention, and enacted both the
Torture Act and the TVPA, providing strong evidence that
there is no federal interest in conflict with holding torturers
liable for their acts.23 °
224. Saleh H, 580 F.3d at 4; Ibrahim H, 556 F. Supp. 2d at 10 ("The federal
interest at stake in the present case is embodied, not by the discretionary
function exception, but by the combatant activities exception.").
225. See Saleh H, 580 F.3d at 24 (Garland, J., dissenting) ("No other circuit
court has gone as far as our circuit goes today.").
226. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1).
227. Saleh H, 580 F.3d at 27 (Garland, J., dissenting).
228. See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 511 (1988) (equating
suits against government contractors with suits against the government that
would "produce the same effect sought to be avoided by the FTCA exemption").
229. Id. at 507 (citations omitted).
230. Saleh 11, 580 F.3d at 26 n.10 (Garland, J., dissenting) ("If anything, the
cited statutes-all of which condemn torture-confirm that there is no conflict
between state law and federal policy on that issue.").
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Unlike the situations in Boyle 231 and Hudgens232 where
the federal interest related to the government's ability to
procure equipment for its military at an affordable cost 233 or
have it properly maintained,234 there is no legitimate
government interest in ensuring that the private contractors
it employs are not held liable for torture. The Saleh I court
argues that "[a]llowance of such suits will surely hamper
military flexibility and cost-effectiveness, as contractors may
prove reluctant to expose their employees to litigation-prone
combat situations."235 It is hard to imagine what legitimate
combat situations the court is referring to that would require
private contractors to commit torture. The government can
never legitimately require that the contractor violate a jus
cogens norm in order to fulfill its contractual obligations with
the government. 236 Therefore, a situation should never arise
where a contractor is forced to choose between failing to
comply with contractual obligations to the federal
government and violating international human rights law.237
Even if a contract required a violation of human rights law,
strong public policy and federal interest argue against finding
the government contractor defense available to such a
contract. 2
231. Boyle, 487 U.S. 500.
232. Hudgens v. Bell Helicopters/Textron, 328 F.3d 1329 (11th Cir. 2003).
233. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 506-07 ("The imposition of liability on Government
contractors will directly affect the terms of Government contracts: either the
contractor will decline to manufacture the design specified by the Government,
or it will raise its price. Either way, the interests of the United States will be
directly affected.").
234. Hudgens, 328 F.3d at 1334 ("We thus hold that the government
contractor defense recognized in Boyle is applicable to the service contract
between the Army and DynCorp.").
235. Saleh 11, 580 F.3d at 8.
236. A jus cogens norm is "a norm from which no derogation is permitted."
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
33.1.
237. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 509 (stating that state law would not be pre-empted if
"[tihe contractor could comply with both its contractual obligations and the
state-prescribed duty of care").
238. STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 27, at 330 ("[Tlhe Supreme Court
considered that the liability of a government contractor for work performed on a
government contract was related to the issue of whether 'what was done was
within the constitutional power of Congress.'" (quoting Yearsley v. W.A. Ross
Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18, 20-21 (1940))).
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V. PROPOSAL
Courts should apply the Sosa standard to any claim
brought by a plaintiff under the ATS for a violation of the law
of nations. 239 The Sosa Court defined the scope of the ATS by
articulating a narrow test, requiring "any claim based on the
present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of international
character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a
specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century
paradigms."240 The Sosa test limits a court's power to create
new causes of action to only the most widely recognized
violations of international law.241
A district court faced with an untested ATS challenge
under the Sosa standard, as in the case of torture committed
by private contractors working for the U.S. government,
should apply the Sosa test to determine if the violation is of a
widely accepted and clearly defined international law
norm. 242 When suits allege torture committed by a private
party,243 district courts should apply the Torture Convention's
definition of torture, which is widely accepted and clearly
defined under international law.24  Courts cannot rely on
pre-Sosa precedent if it limits its ability to create a cause of
action warranted under Sosa's holding.245
Applying the Sosa standard and the proper definition of
torture, district courts should not dismiss ATS cases
involving acts of torture on the basis that only state actors
239. See supra note 51.
240. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004).
241. Id. at 712 ("Although we agree the statute is in terms only
jurisdictional, we think that at the time of enactment the jurisdiction enabled
federal courts to hear claims in a very limited category defined by the law of
nations and recognized at common law.").
242. See id. at 725.
243. Courts addressing ATS claims alleging torture by public officials do not
have to go through the Sosa standard because the Sosa Court already
recognized torture as a violation that meets the standard. See id. at 732, 737
(citing Fildrtiga's application of torture as a cause of action, as an example
where the federal courts correctly recognized a "private claim[] under federal
common law for violations of [an] international law norm").
244. STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 27, at 141; see also van der Vyver, supra
note 69, at 432.
245. See Jama 11, 343 F. Supp. 2d 338, 358 (D.N.J. 2004) ("Sosa requires that
this court revise its legal rulings and employ a different method of analysis in
determining if plaintiffs have produced evidence to support an ATCA claim
against any of the remaining defendants."); see also Casto, supra note 51, at
635-36 ("[All analyses of ATS litigation must flow from Sosa's guidelines.").
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can commit torture. Private actors can commit torture if they
act "at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence
of a public official or other person acting in an official
capacity."24 6  Courts should recognize the gap that exists
between the Torture Convention's requirement of state
involvement24 and the much higher day-to-day control or
command authority, required for sovereign immunity under
FTCA and the government contractor defense, respectively.248
The court's obligation is, therefore, to determine to what
extent a private party has acted according to the definition of
torture, and then determine whether the government's day-
to-day control or command authority was less than absolute.
A proper analysis of ATS claims under the Sosa standard
requires a court to first, accept that private parties can
commit torture under the Torture Convention's definition,
and second, recognize that the level of state involvement
differs for torture and sovereign immunity. This approach
should result in a strengthening of human rights protection
in U.S. courts. Plaintiffs would have a venue to seek relief for
egregious human rights violations, and the U.S. government
would be prevented from using private actors to circumvent
liability for acts of torture. Such an approach would also act
as a forceful deterrent to the thousands of private contractors
working for the U.S. government, who would have notice that
acts in violation of international human rights law will create
liability-both for the individual torturer and the corporation
that employs him or her. Impunity for human rights
violations committed by the United States or parties working
for it not only injures the victims and their families, it also
246. Torture Convention, supra note 5, art. 1; see Marchesi, supra note 71, at
211.
247. Torture Convention, supra note 5, art. 1.
248. Saleh H, 580 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ("During wartime, where a
private service contractor is integrated into combatant activities over which the
military retains command authority, a tort claim arising out of the contractor's
engagement in such activities shall be preempted."); see cases cited supra note
98. Note that the D.C. Circuit's expansion of the government contractor defense
is unique to the D.C. Circuit and is heavily criticized. It is included here, not as
a recognition of its accuracy, but to show that even if courts apply this
expansive grant of protection to the private contractors, courts could still found
a contractor liable for torture if the acts involve sufficient state action to be
defined as torture, but the contractor is not fully "integrated into combatant
activities over which the military retains command authority." Saleh H, 580
F.3d at 9.
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seriously harms the reputation of the United States as a
staunch promoter of human rights around the world..
VI. CONCLUSION
Acts of torture require state involvement, but a finding of
too much state involvement may provide sovereign
immunity. 9 This problem, however, has a solution. First,
courts should accept that private parties can commit torture.
Second, courts should recognize the gap between the required
level of government involvement for torture and the sovereign
immunity related defenses and determine whether the
private party that committed the torture was operating in
that area.2 50  Applying the Sosa standard to every claim
under the ATS will ensure that courts properly comply with
the original meaning of the statute. This will strengthen the
continued pursuit for justice and accountability in U.S. courts
that started with Filartiga, assuring a venue in which to hold
human rights violators liable for their commission of heinous
international crimes.
249. See supra Part V.
250. See supra Part IV.B.1.
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